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In-deed, making progress in a generation is ac-tually quite fast: progress at this speed would represent immense development gains for countries such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia, and Timor-Leste today. Creating the legitimate institutions that can prevent repeated violence is, in plain lan-guage, slow. It takes a generation. Even the fastest-transforming countries have taken between 15 and 30 years to raise their institu-tional performance from that of a fragile state today—Haiti, say—to that of a functioning institutionalized state, such as Ghana table 2.

Drug and human tra cking, money laundering, illegal exploitation of natural resources and wildlife, counterfeiting, and viola-tions of intellectual property rights are lucrative criminal activities, which facilitate the penetration by organized crime of the already vulnerable sociopolitical, judicial, and security structures in developing countries. In Central America, for example, several countries that regained political stability two decades ago are now facing the decay of the state, whose institutions lack the strength to face this onslaught. Transnational organized crime has converted some Carib-bean countries into corridors for the movement of illegal drugs and persons toward Europe and North America. Bolivia, Colom-bia, and Peru, continue to be the main global cocaine producers, while Mexico is facing an unprecedented wave of violence given its border with the largest immigrant, drug consumption, and arms producing market.

West Africa has become the newest pas-sage of drugs coming from South America and destined for Europe. The unprecedented progression of organized crime could spell the collapse of many weak states as their institutions fall prey to the associated violence. The precari-ous economic development observed in many regions of the world provides a stimulus for consolidating these illegal activities, which will continue to thrive as a consequence of the impunity they encounter in developing countries.

Fearon "nds that countries with above average governance indicators for their income level have a signi"cantly lower risk of the outbreak of civil con! This work con"rms earlier directions in the policy community, such as the International Network for Con! Measures of accountability are as important as measures of capacity in this calculation. Fearon "nds that high levels of polit-ical terror in past periods increase the chances of current con! Walter "nds that signi"cant reductions in the number of political prisoners and extrajudicial killings make the renewal of civil war between two and three times less likely than in coun-tries with higher levels of human rights abuses.

Second is the priority of transforming institutions that provide citi-zen security, justice, and jobs. Third is the role of regional and international action to contain external stresses. Fourth is the spe-cialized nature of external support needed. Institutional transformation and good governance, central to these processes, work differently in fragile situations. The goal is more focused—transforming institutions that deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs. When facing the risk of conflict and violence, citizen security, justice and jobs are the key elements of protection to achieve human se-curity.

A good analogy is a finan-cial crisis caused by a combination of external stresses and weaknesses in institutional checks and balances. Confidence-building—a concept used in political mediation and financial crises but rarely in development circles52—is a prelude to more permanent institutional change in the face of violence. Because low trust means that stakeholders who need to con-. Our knowledge of how to break these cycles is partial: the Report lays out lessons drawn from existing research, country stud-ies, and consultations with national reformers.

Experiences from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Liberia, Mozambique, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Timor-Leste amongst others, are drawn on frequently in the Report because, while all of these areas still face challenges and risks, these societies have achieved consider-able successes in preventing violence from escalating or recovering from its aftermath. These and the other experiences in the Report also span a range of high-income, middle- income and lower-income countries, a range of threats of political and criminal violence, and differing institutional contexts, rang-ing from situations where strong institutions faced legitimacy challenges due to problems of inclusion and accountability to situations where weak capacity was a major constraint.

There are some fundamental differences between fragile and violent situations and stable developing environments. First is the need to restore confidence in collective ac-tion before embarking on wider institutional. The table shows the historical range of timings that the fastest reformers in the 20th century took to achieve basic governance transformations. For each loop of the spi-ral, the same two phases recur: building con-fidence that positive chance is possible, prior to deepening the institutional transformation and strengthening governance outcomes.

The state cannot restore confidence alone. Confidence-building in situations of violence and fragility requires deliberate effort to build inclusive-enough coalitions, as Indonesia did in addressing violence in Aceh or Timor-Leste in its recovery after the renewed violence in or Chile in its political transition. Just as in a financial crisis, progress will not be sustained unless the institutions that pro-vide citizen security, justice, and an economic stake in society are transformed to prevent a recurrence of violence.

Just as violence repeats, efforts to build confidence and transform institutions typi-cally follow a repeated spiral. Stemming illegal financial flows from the public purse or from natural resource trafficking is important to underpin these initiatives. For example, Lebanon restored the electricity needed for economic recovery during the civil war through small private-sector networks of providers, albeit at high unit costs. Second, focusing on citizen security, jus-tice, and jobs means that most other reforms will need to be sequenced and paced over time, including political reform, decentral-ization, privatization, and shifting attitudes toward marginalized groups. Systematically implementing these reforms requires a web of institutions democratization, for example, requires many institutional checks and bal-ances beyond elections and changes in social attitudes.

Several successful political transi-tions, such as the devolution that underpins peace in Northern Ireland and democratic transitions in Chile, Indonesia, or Portugal, have taken place through a series of steps over a decade or more. There are exceptions—where the exclu-sion of groups from democratic participation has been a clear overriding source of griev-ance, rapid action on elections makes sense; and where interests that previously blocked reform have diminished, as with post-war Japanese or Republic of Korea land reform,59 fast action can take advantage of a window of opportunity.

But in most situations, system-atic and gradual action appears to work best. Inclusive-enough coalitions apply just as much to criminal as to political violence, through collaboration with community lead-ers, business, and civil society in areas affected by criminal violence. Actions in one domain can support results in another. Security operations can facilitate safe trade and transit, and the eco-nomic activity that creates jobs. Services deliv-ered to marginalized groups can support per-ceptions of justice. More detailed approaches to support inclusive-enough coalitions are described in the section on practical policies and programs for country actors below. On the African National Congress ANC Alliance side, this included the shift to a broader, more inclu-sive approach, and the realization of the need to ensure incentives for the National Party and the white population.

On the National Party side, this included the shift from think-ing in terms of group rights and protection of minorities to thinking in terms of individual rights and majority rule. After the elections, deliver-ing a few early results—including maternal and infant healthcare and using community structures to improve water supply—were important to maintain con"dence in our new government. This included too little attention to job creation for youth and risks of criminal violence. It meant that we did not fully address the critical need to ensure that the new generation who had not lived through the apartheid struggle as adults were provided with a strong stake—and economic opportunities—in the new democratic state.

There was also too much of an assumption that marked the culmination of a process of democratization and reconciliation. Relatively little attention was given to what was meant by the transformation to a constitutional state; the con-tinued role of civil society in deepening not just democratiza-tion and accountability but also delivery. And there was a need for a deeper and more thorough ongoing debate on racism, inequality, and social exclusion. Actions to restore security, create trust, generate employment, and provide services in local communities lay the foundation for national progress.

It is not enough to deliver results in big cities. In cases of ethnic and religious strife, where mutual insecurity can feed on itself, a local authority that is seen to be fair and impartial by all groups is absolutely essential before the process of healing and recovery can take place. It takes time to build institutions. Getting the urgent things done "rst, especially improving security and provid-ing jobs, helps people to feel more hopeful about the future. Success then creates the condition for further success.

For Singapore in the early years, the priority was on security, law and order, and creating favorable conditions for investment and economic growth. Con"dence was everything. National Service was intro-duced within a year. Secret societies and other criminal activi-ties were suppressed. Corruption was progressively rooted out. To promote investment and job creation, labor and land acqui-sition laws were reformed early. Against conventional wisdom in many developing countries at that time, we eschewed pro-tectionism and encouraged multinationals to invest. Managing the politics of change was always a challenge.

The key was winning the trust of the people. It is a process which takes at least a generation. External stresses, such as the infiltration of organized crime and trafficking networks, spillovers from neighboring conflicts, and economic shocks, are important factors in increasing the risk of violence. In fragile situ-ations, many of these external pressures will. If they are not addressed, or if they increase, they can de-rail efforts at violence prevention and recov-ery. Far more so than in stable development environments, addressing external stresses therefore needs to be a core part of national strategies and international supporting ef-forts for violence prevention and recovery.

The challenge we faced in was preventing Colombia from becoming a failed state. This meant shielding our citi-zens from kidnapping and terrorism. It also meant protect-ing our infrastructure, roads, and democratic institutions against attacks by the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and drug tra ckers. These groups hijacked cars and kidnapped peo-ple as they travelled across the country. Since this problem had worsened in the years ahead of the elections, the government set the restoration of security in roads and highways as a key priority on their agenda. Meteoro aimed at restoring control of the roads and high-ways across the country back from the illegitimate hand of armed groups that in!

The govern-ment invited the Colombian population to drive their cars and travel across the country without intimidation, while at the same time launching a major military, intelligence, and police operation to protect the roads and ensure the safety of the population. Through this plan, the government sought to give people back their country and to reactivate trade and tourism. Above all, this plan, implemented at the very early stage of the new government, brought about a breakthrough in the resto-ration of trust and hope in the Colombian society. Similarly, the election in Af -ghanistan proved to challenge rather than bolster perceptions of institutional legitimacy in the immediate aftermath. The options are not mutually exclusive—there is great worldwide demand for more inclusive and responsive gover-nance, and elections can be a crucial means to provide this.

But their timing requires careful attention. Democratic traditions have developed in most countries over a considerable period. F E AT U R E 3 Country experiences of confidence-building and transforming institutions for citizen security, justice, and jobs continued. The Report first presents the basic tools and then looks at how to differentiate strategies and program-ming to different country circumstances, us-ing country-specific assessments of risks and opportunities.

There is a surprising commonality across countries in the signals that most frequently build confidence and collaborative coali-tions see Feature 4. They can include im-mediate actions in credible national or local appointments, in transparency, and in some cases, the removal of factors seen as nega-tive, such as discriminatory laws. Security forces can be redeployed as a positive signal of attention to insecure areas, but also as a sign that the government recognizes where particular units have a record of distrust or abuse with communities and replaces them.

Measures to improve transparency of infor-mation and decision-making processes can be important in building confidence, as well as laying the basis for sustained institutional transformation. Signals can also be announcements of fu-ture actions—the selection of two or three key early results; the focus of military and police planning on citizen security goals; or setting approaches and timelines toward political reform, decentralization, or tran-sitional justice. Ensuring that political and policy signals are realistic in scope and tim-ing and can be delivered is important in managing expectations—by anchoring them in national planning and budget processes and discussing any external support needed in advance with international partners.

When signals relate to future action, their credibility will be increased by commitment mechanisms that persuade stakeholders that they will actually be implemented and not reversed. International assistance needs also differ in fragile situations. The requirement to gen-erate rapid confidence-building results puts a particular premium on speed. The focus on building collaborative, inclusive-enough coalitions and on citizen security, justice, and jobs draws together a wider range of international capacities that need to work in concert—for example, for mediation, hu-man rights, and security assistance, as well as humanitarian and development aid.

Where the political situation is fragile and the capac-ity of local systems to ensure accountability is weak, international incentives—such as recognition and sanction mechanisms—also play a significant role. So regional and global recognition for responsible leadership can play a role in strengthening incentives and accountability systems at a national level. The WDR lays out a different way of thinking about approaches to violence prevention and recovery in fragile situations. While the choice of confidence-building measures and institution-building approaches needs to be adapted to each country, a set of basic tools emerging from experience can be the basis for that adaptation.

These core tools include the options for signals and com-mitment mechanisms to build collabora-tive coalitions, demonstrating a break from the past and building confidence in positive outcomes. They also include a description of the programs that can deliver quick results and longer-term institutional provision of. Signals: Future Signals: Commitment Supporting policy and priorities Immediate actions mechanisms actions. The core program tools that emerge from different country experiences are deliber-ately kept small in number to reflect country lessons on focus and priorities. They are all designed to be delivered at scale, in large na-tional or subnational programs rather than small projects.

They include multisectoral programs linking community structures with the state; security sector reform; justice re-form; national employment policy and pro-grams; associated services that support citi-zen security, justice, and job creation, such as electricity and social protection; and phased approaches to corruption. They also include programs that can be crucial for sustained violence prevention: political reform, decen-tralization, transitional justice, and education reform where systematic attention is needed once early reforms in citizen security, justice, and jobs have started to make progress. These include community-based programs for violence prevention, employment, and as-sociated service delivery, and access to local justice and dispute resolution.

Examples are community policing in a wide range of higher-, middle-, and lower-income coun-tries, the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program, and Latin American multisec-toral violence prevention programs. Early reform programs should focus on simple basic func tions such as criminal caseload pro-cessing, adequate basic investigation, and arrest procedures ; include civilian over-sight, vetting, and budget and expenditure transparency to dismantle covert or crimi-nal networks; and link the pace of reform between the police and civilian justice sys-tems to avoid situations where increasing.

Strong strategic communication on these signals of change are always important—actions and policy changes cannot influence behaviors unless people know they have taken place and how they fit into a broader vision. Where the risks of crisis escalation are not fully recognized by all national leaders, providing an accurate and compelling mes-sage on the consequences of inaction can help galvanize momentum for progress. Eco-nomic and social analyses can support this narrative—by showing how rising violence and failing institutions are causing national or subnational areas to lag far behind their neighbors in development progress; or by showing how other countries that have failed to address rising threats have faced severe and long-lasting development consequences.

The WDR analysis provides some clear messages:. Some of the early confidence-building re-sults that can be targeted through these pro-grams include freedom of movement along transit routes, electricity coverage, number of businesses registered and employment days created, processing of judicial caseloads, and. What is crucial here is that early results generate improvements in the morale of national institutions and set the right in-centives for later institution-building. For example, if security forces are set targets based on the number of rebel com-batants killed or captured or criminals ar-rested, they may rely primarily on coercive approaches, with no incentive to build the longer-term trust with communities that will prevent violence from recurring.

Targets based on citizen security freedom of move-ment and so on , in contrast, create longer-term incentives for the role of the security forces in underpinning national unity and effective state-society relations. Similarly, if services and public works are delivered only through top-down national programs, there will be few incentives for communities to take responsibility for violence prevention or for national institutions to undertake responsi-bility to protect all vulnerable citizens, men and women. A mixture of state and nonstate, bottom-up and top-down approaches is a better underpinning for longer-term institu-tional transformation. Phasing transitions from humanitarian aid is also an important part of transform-ing institutions. In countries where current stresses overwhelm national institutional ca-pacity by a large margin, national reformers often draw on international humanitarian capacity to deliver early results.

These pro-grams can be effective in saving lives, building confidence, and extending national capacity. But a difficult trade-off occurs in deciding on the time needed to shift these functions to national institutions. For food programs, this generally means phasing down deliver-ies before local harvests and moving from general distribution to targeted programs, in coordination with government social pro-tection agencies where possible. For health, education, water, and sanitation, it means reducing international roles step-by-step over time as the capacity of national or local institutions increases—as in the transition.

Actions on these issues are discussed in Part 3 under Directions for International Policy. National leaders and their partners on the ground cannot individ-ually determine these broader changes to the international system, but they can maximize the benefits of existing support. It helps when national leaders and their international partners in the field lay out clear program priorities across the security, justice, and development domains.

Country experiences indicate that efforts need to fo-cus on only two or three rapid results to build confidence, and on narrowly and realistically defined institution-building. Priorities are better laid out in a very limited number of clear programs—such as community-based interventions in insecure areas, security and freedom of movement on key roads—as in Liberia69 after the civil war and in Colom-bia70 in the face of criminal violence in Using the national budget process to decide on priority programs coordinates messages and develops cooperation in implementa-tion between the security and development ministries.

National leaders can also produce bet-ter results from external assistance by being alert to the needs of international partners to show results and manage risks. Interna-tional partners have their own domestic pressures—to demonstrate that assistance is not misused and to attribute results to their endeavors. A frank exchange on risks and re-sults helps to find ways to bridge differences. Societies do not have the luxury of trans-forming their institutions in isolation—they need at the same time to manage external pressures, whether from economic shocks or trafficking and international corruption. Many of these issues are beyond the control of each nation-state to address, and the last section of the Report considers international policy to diminish external stresses.

National leaders may play a significant role in galva-nizing broad regional or global cooperation on issues such as trafficking, as well as bilat-eral cooperation. Possible initiatives include:. Cross-border development programming could simply involve special arrangements to share lessons. But it could also move to-ward formal joint arrangements to design and monitor development programs in insecure border areas and move toward specific provisions to help insecure land-locked areas gain access to markets. Direct measure-ment of security improvements can also show rapid progress, but while data on violent deaths are fairly easy to collect, they are not available for the countries that would benefit most from them: low-income, fragile states.

Employment data needs to be upgraded. While there is a basic set of tools emerging from experience, each country needs to assess its circumstances and adapt lessons from oth-ers to the local political context. Each country faces different stresses, different institutional challenges, different stakeholders who need to be involved to make a difference, and dif-ferent types of transition opportunities. The differences are not black and white but occur across a spectrum—each country will have different manifestations of violence, different combinations of internal or external stresses, and different institutional challenges—and these factors will change over time. But all countries face some aspects of this mix. The Report covers some of the most important differences in country circumstances through the simple differentiation shown below.

National reformers and their country counterparts need to take two types of deci-sions in each phase of confidence-building and institutional reform, taking into account the local political context. Second is to decide on the design. Clare Lockhart, is another way of managing different perspectives on risk, the speed of response, and long-term engagement with national institutions—by making dual ac-countability of donor funds explicit. To evaluate the success of programs and adapt them when problems arise, national reformers and their international partners in country also need information on overall re-sults in reducing violence, and on citizen con-fidence in security, justice, and employment goals at regular intervals.

For most develop-ing countries, the MDGs and their associ-ated targets and indicators are the dominant international framework. The MDGs have raised the profile of broad-based human de-velopment and remain important long-term goals for countries facing fragility and vio-lence. But they have drawbacks in their direct relevance to progress in violence prevention and recovery. They do not cover citizen secu-rity and justice. They move slowly, so they do not provide national reformers or their inter-national partners with rapid feedback loops that can demonstrate areas of progress and identify new or remaining risks.

A useful supplement to the MDGs would be indicators that more directly measure violence reduction, confidence-building and citizen security and justice Feature 4. Citi-zen polling data, glaringly absent in many fragile and conflict-affected countries, could help fill this role. Key stakeholders: Internal versus external stakeholders; state versus nonstate stakeholders; low-income versus middle-high income stakeholders. But the mix of different types of violence does affect strategy. Inequality among ethnic, religious, or geographical groups is important as a risk for civil conflict—employment programs and services would thus target equity and bridging opportunities among these groups.

But for organized criminal violence, inequal-ity between rich and poor matters more ir-respective of ethnic or religious identities. Violence with strong international links—organized crime, international recruitment into ideological movements—requires great-er international cooperation. Both Colombia and Haiti are considering reform in the justice sector, but accountability and capacity problems are a bigger challenge in Haiti, and reforms would have to be designed accordingly.

So national reformers and their international partners need to think through the political economy for interventions and adapt pro-gram design to that context Feature 5. Each country needs its own assessment of risks and priorities to design the best-fit strategy and programs for its political con-text. In differentiating political and policy sig-nals, the type of stresses faced and the stake-holders whose support is most needed for effective action make a difference.

Where ethnic, geographical, or religious divides have been associated with conflict, and the coop-eration of these groups is critical to progress, the credibility of appointments may rest on whether individuals command respect across group divides. The type of transition moment also makes a difference. Institutional capacity, accountability, and trust among groups also affect the choices and timetable of early policy announcements.

In countries with institutions that are strong but have been viewed as illegitimate because they are exclusive, abusive, or unaccountable as in some transitions from authoritarian rule , ac-tion on transparency, participation, and jus-tice may be more important for short-term confidence-building than delivering goods and services. Where social cohesion is fac-tionalized, time may be needed to build trust between groups before wider reform is at-tempted.

In South Africa, for example, leaders wisely allowed time for constitutional reform and the development of trust between groups before the first post-Apartheid election. A core message is that the particular manifestation of violence at any one time is less important than the underlying insti-. Specifically, while processes exist to provide the kind of post-war assistance typical of 20th century paradigms, there is little attention to helping countries that struggle with prevention of repeated cycles of political and criminal violence Feature 6, figure 6.

Internal inter-national agency processes are too slow, too fragmented, too reliant on parallel systems, and too quick to exit, and there are significant divisions among international actors. The range of preventive tools in the inter-national system has improved, with increases in global and regional mediation capacity78 and in programs that support both local and national collaborative efforts to mediate violence. Such programs do often support ac-tivities relating to citizen security, justice, and jobs, but they are not in the mainstream of diplomatic, security, or development think-ing.

But these programs are still not delivered to scale. It is much harder for countries to get international assistance to support develop-ment of their police forces and judiciaries than their militaries. International economic development assistance is easier to obtain for macroeconomic policy, health, or education capacities than for job creation. UN police capacity, doctrinal development, and training have increased, but are not fully linked to jus-tice capacities. While some bilateral agencies. International action has delivered great ben-efits in improved security and prosperity. Many individuals working on fragile and conflict-affected states are dedicated professionals attempting to support national efforts. The basic elements of a post-conflict community develop-ment program are simple and can be adapted to a broad.

All community programs under state auspices consist, essentially, of a community decision-making mechanisms to determine priorities and the provision of funds and technical help to implement them. Within this model is a great deal of variance that can be adapted to dif-ferent types of stresses and institutional capacities as well as to different opportunities for transition. Three important sources of variance are in how community decision-making is done, who controls the funds, and where programs reside within the government. Different stresses and institutional capacity and account-ability affect community decision-making.

In many violent areas, preexisting community councils either have been de-stroyed or were already discredited. A critical first step is to reestablish credible participatory forms of representation. In Burundi, for example, a local NGO organized elections for representative community development committees in the participating communes that cut across ethnic divides. Community councils were largely in-tact, and national laws already provided for local, demo cratic, village elections. Indonesia also experimented with separat-ing grants to Muslim and Christian villages to minimize in-tercommunal tensions, but eventually used common funds and councils to bridge divides between these communities.

Different institutional challenges also affect who holds the funds. Programs must weigh the trade-offs between a first objective of building trust with the risks of money going miss-ing or the elite capture of resources, as shown in the following examples:. The type of transition moment affects how community decision-making structures align with the formal government administration.

Many countries emerging from conflict will also undergo major constitutional and administrative reforms just as the early response community programs are being launched. Aligning community councils with the emergent structures of government can be difficult. Commission survey of assistance to Cambo-dia, more than 35 percent of all projects were less than one year in duration, and 66 percent were less than three years. Despite the need for more consistent and sustained assistance, aid to fragile states is much more volatile than that to nonfragile states—indeed, more than twice as volatile, with an estimated loss in efficiency of 2. Regional and global action on exter-nal stresses is a key part of risk reduction, but assistance is still focused primarily at the individual country level.

Some innova-tive processes against trafficking combine demand-side and supply-side incentives and the efforts of multiple stakeholders in de-veloped and developing countries86—one is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to stem the sale of conflict diamonds. And they are constrained by a multiplica-tion of weak and overlapping multicoun-try endeavors rather than strong and well- resourced regional approaches. Despite some exceptions—the Asian Development Bank and European Union long-standing regional programs, the UN Department of Political Affairs regional offices, and recent increases in regional lending by the World Bank—most development donors focus primarily on national rather than regional support.

The international landscape is becoming more complex. The end of the Cold War had the potential to usher in a new age of consen-sus in international support to violence and conflict-affected areas. In fact, the last decade has seen an increase in complexity and con-tinued coordination problems. The political, security, humanitarian, and development ac-tors present in each country situation have become more numerous. Legal agreements that set standards for responsible national leadership have become more complicated.

International financial institu-tions and bilateral economic assistance tends to focus primarily on growth rather than em-ployment. Citizen security and justice are not mentioned in the MDGs. The programs described above all require linked action by diplomatic, security, and development—and sometimes humanitar-ian—actors. Yet these actors generally assess priorities and develop their programs sepa-rately, with efforts to help national reformers build unified programs the exception rather than the rule. Assistance is often slow to arrive despite efforts of the UN, the international finan-cial institutions, and bilateral donors to es-tablish quick-disbursing and rapid deploy-ment facilities.

Aid is fragmented into small projects, making it difficult for governments to concentrate efforts on a few key results. Despite progress in ex-tending the time horizons of peacekeeping missions and some types of donor assistance, the system is constrained by a short-term fo-cus on post-conflict opportunities and high volatility in assistance. International actors need to be accountable to their citizens and taxpayers as well as to partner country needs, and these expectations can be at odds figure 3.

The slow progress in changing donor be-havior comes from these underlying incen-tives. Do-mestic pressures also contribute to divisions among donors, since some donors face far more domestic pressure than others on cor-ruption, gender equity, or the need to show economic benefits at home from aid overseas. Accountability to taxpayers is a desirable facet of donor aid—but the challenge is to make domestic expectations fit with the needs and realities of assistance on the ground. Multilateral responses are also constrained by historical arrangements suited to more stable environments. Within OECD countries, there are di-vided views over the relative role of security and development assistance and over aid through national institutions.

The increase in assistance from middle-income countries, with a history of solidarity support, not only brings valuable new energy, resources, and ideas, but also new challenges in the differ-ing views of international partners. Dual accountability is at the heart of in-ternational behavior. International actors know that faster, smarter, longer-term en-gagement through national and regional institutions is needed to help societies exit fragility. But as highlighted by the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fra-gility,88 they are also acutely sensitive to the risks of domestic criticism of waste, abuse,. The four countries below provide an illustration. It was not uncommon for total aid to Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Haiti to drop by 20 or 30 percent in one year and increase by up to 50 percent the following year humanitarian aid and debt relief, excluded from these statistics, would further increase the volatility.

A one-o" concept of progress and the di culties of prevention have led to an excessive focus on post-con! The amount of aid and peacekeeping assistance going to countries after civil war has ended greatly exceeds what is provided to coun-tries struggling to prevent an escalation of con! Over the last 20 years, countries that experienced longer periods of fragility, violence, or con! Figure 6. This relationship, re! Volatility of revenues has considerable costs for all governments, but particularly so in fragile situations where it may derail reform e"orts and disrupt institution-building. They thus have difficulty adapting to situations where security conditions change between the design and tendering of a proj-ect, where a small number of qualified gov-ernment counterparts struggle to manage complex procurement documentation, and where the number of qualified contractors prepared to compete and mobilize is very lim-ited.

Similarly, the UN Secretariat originally developed procurement systems designed for its function as a headquarters-based advisory service and secretariat to the General Assem-bly. But when peacekeeping operations were launched, these systems were extended with relatively little adaptation, despite the differ-ence in contexts and objectives. To achieve real change in approaches that can restore confidence and prevent risks from recurring, international actors could con-sider four tracks to improve global responses for security and development as follows:. Track 1: Provide more, and more inte-grated, specialized assistance for citizen security, justice, and jobs—targeting pre-vention in both immediate post-conflict and rising risk situations.

Track 2: Reform internal agency systems to provide rapid action to restore confi-dence and promote long-term institution-building, in support of national efforts. Track 4: Marshal support from lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries, and global and regional institutions, to re-flect the changing landscape of interna-tional policy and assistance. Track 1: Providing specialized assistance for prevention through citizen security, justice, and jobs. Security-development linkages apply in all areas struggling to prevent large-scale po-litical or criminal violence. Both political and. They are in varying forms a problem for larger and more prosperous countries facing subnational urban or rural violence, for countries emerg-ing from conflict and fragility that need to pre-vent recurrence, and for areas facing new or resurgent threats of social protest and instabil-ity.

A key lesson of successful violence pre-vention and recovery is that security, justice, and economic stresses are linked: approaches that try to solve them through military-only, justice-only, or development-only solutions will falter. A specialized suite of programs is needed in fragile environments, combin-ing elements of security, justice, and eco-nomic transformation. But because these areas are covered by different international agencies, both bilaterally and multilaterally, combined action under one overall pro-gram framework is rare.

A specialized suite of combined security-justice-development programs needs to aim at a catalytic effect, supporting national collaborative efforts to address these challenges. Changes in inter-national agency approaches to support such programs would include figure 3. This should include specific efforts to support the growing role of regional and subregional institutions, such as AU and ECOWAS, by providing them with specific links to de-velopment expertise.

Two priorities for combined programs are—. Technical assistance and financing for security and justice reforms sup-ported by combined teams. Develop-ment agencies, for example, can sup-port measures to address budget and expenditure processes in security and justice functions, while partners with security and justice expertise can con-tribute to technical capacity-building, as was done in Timor-Leste in the run- up to independence. Multisectoral community programs that involve policing and justice as well as development activities, such as the initiatives in Latin America to provide. State-community, state-NGO, state-private sector programs for service delivery and multi-sectoral violence prevention.

There are areas where, at the request of government, the Bank and other institutional financial institutions IFIs could consider playing a greater role in sup-porting the developmental underpinnings of violence prevention within their mandates—such as the links between public financial management and security sector reform and institution-building, legal administration, jus-tice systems development and multisectoral approaches at the community level that com-bine community policing and justice services with social cohesion, developmental and em-ployment creation programs.

But the IFIs are not equipped to lead specialized international support in these areas. A clear lead within the UN system would help this effort. Agencies with economic expertise need to pay more attention to jobs. National community-based public works programs should receive greater and longer-term sup-port in fragile situations, in recognition of the time required for the private sector to absorb youth unemployment. Other priority pro-grams for job creation include investments in supporting infrastructure, in particular, elec-tricity and transit.

A third program cluster is those that invest in skills and work experience; develop links between producers, traders, and consumers; and expand access to finance and assets, for example, through low-income housing. Current international financial in-stitutions and UN initiatives focused on em-ployment creation should explicitly address the specific needs of areas affected by fragility, conflict, and violence, recognizing that job creation in these situations may go beyond material benefits by providing a productive role and occupation for youth, and evalu-ating and expanding the examples of best-fit employment policies in fragile situations presented in this Report.

Global employment work should include re-focusing on the risks posed by youth employment. These approaches would help. But there is likely to be continued pressure from large youth unemployed populations unless a more significant international effort is launched. Implementing these programs would re-quire systemic changes in international capac-ity.

Citizen security and justice require new and interlinked capacities to address repeated waves of political and criminal violence. The starting point for deeper capacity in this area is government investment in standby, pre-trained personnel for a range of executive and advisory police, corrections, and justice func-tions. States will need police and justice re-serves to respond effectively to contemporary violence, drawing on retired personnel, active service volunteers, and formed police units in some countries. Second, these capacities must be trained, and able to deploy, under shared doctrine to address the challenges of coher-ence presented by different national policing models. Increased investment through the UN and regional centers in the development of joint doctrine and pretraining of govern-ment capacities would increase effectiveness and reduce incoherence.

Third, linking military and policing assis-tance with justice assistance is crucial, since disconnects have been a pervasive source of problems in fragile situations. So is link-ing criminal justice assistance with help for local justice services such as land and prop-erty disputes. Last, ownership for justice reform work should be clarified in the international struc-ture to enable multilateral and bilateral agen-. This approach may man-age donor risk, but it constrains real progress in institution-building on the ground. An alternative is to embrace faster engagement through national institutions, but vary the ways aid is delivered to manage risks and re-sults. Some donors have a higher risk toler-ance and will be able to choose modes that go more directly through national budgets and institutions; others will need greater over-sight or nonstate involvement in delivery.

Three complementary options:. Variations in delivery mechanisms include community struc-tures, civil society, the private sector, the UN, and other international executing agencies in delivering programs jointly with state institutions. A bolder approach could draw together ca-pacities from development agencies, the pri-vate sector, foundations, and NGOs in a new global partnership to galvanize investments in countries and communities where high unemployment and social disengagement contribute to the risks of conflict. Private-sector capacities to draw on would include large companies that trade and invest in insecure areas creating links with local entrepreneurs , as well as technology companies that can assist with connectivity and training in remote insecure areas.

To implement rapid, sustained, and inte-grated programs for citizen security, justice, and jobs, international agencies need inter-nal reforms. International agency systems would require fundamental changes to implement these programs effec-tively, based on the following four principles how to approach implementing these is cov-ered in Feature 7 :. After the election in Liberia, the new government announced a day plan that included the restoration of electricity to certain areas of the capital to help restore con"dence in the state and jumpstart recovery in economic activities and basic services.

With ECOWAS support, the Liberian government approached various donors to help, since the new government lacked resources and institu-tional capacity for implementation. None of the traditional donors, which included the United Nations, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and USAID, were able to provide the generators needed for this endeavor within the desired timeframe under their regular systems. The Liberian government was eventually success-ful in securing help from the Government of Ghana, which. The Liberian experience points to two key lessons. First is the need for early consultation between national governments and international partners on realism in delivering quick results and demonstrating progress to local populations.

Second is the challenge of rigidities in donor systems unable to provide par-ticular types of assistance fast. In fact, the EU, USAID, and the World Bank were able to provide other types of support fuel, transmission line restoration for the electricity system within the days, but none of the donors were able to cover the speci"c need for generators. Indeed, there is a need to rethink existing policies and processes, to modify what I call procedural conformism for countries in crisis situations. Economic and social interventions in situations of insecurity can justi"ably be designed to contribute to citizen security and justice outcomes in the Liberia electricity program above, an increase in citizen trust in government would have been an appropriate measure of program success, rather than the sustainability of the electricity provision.

Security programs can also be designed to contribute to development outcomes an increase in trade, for example. Base budget and "duciary processes on the real world: insecurity, lack of perfectly competitive markets, and weak institutions. When insecurity is high, both the costs and bene"ts of interventions may change dramatically over a short period. This argues for greater! In program budgets, it implies careful sequencing wherein some programs will be more bene"cial at a later date, but also placing high weight on speed over some cost-e ciency and quality concerns in contracting where bene"ts to fast action are high.

Where institutional capacity is insu cient, procedures need to be distilled to the simplest level of due process, together with! Transparent publication of achievements against target timelines for donor funds release and activities—and reasons for delays—would also help. This is not how most assistance works, however: donors expect the same degree of success in risky environments as in secure ones. International agencies need to think care-fully about how to lengthen the duration of assistance to meet the realities of institutional transformation over a generation without raising costs. For humanitarian programs in prolonged crises, building on existing initia-tives to support local staffing, local purchases, and community-based delivery can increase the impact on institution-building and lower unit costs.

For peacekeeping, there is potential for greater use of more flexible arrangements, including over-the-horizon security guaran-tees, where external forces outside the coun-try either supplement forces on the ground during tense periods or extend the leverage of external peacekeeping after missions are drawn down—as suggested in inputs to this Report from the AU and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Better resourc-ing for mediation and diplomatic facilitation is also an easy win, since it is low cost and can reduce the probabilities of conflict. For development agencies, reducing the volatility of flows to programs delivering re-sults in citizen security, justice, and jobs—or simply preserving social cohesion and human and institutional capacity—can increase im-pact without increasing the overall cost.

As al-ready described, volatility greatly reduces aid effectiveness, and it is twice as high for fragile and conflict-affected countries as for other developing countries, despite their greater need for persistence in building social and state institutions. There are options for re-ducing volatility, including providing thresh-old amounts of aid based on appropriate modalities as described by Advisory Council member Paul Collier in chapter 9 , topping up aid allocations to the most fragile states when specific types of programs have demon-.

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